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The difficulty of showing authentic compassion is a major preoccupation of Simone Weil’s 
work. This difficulty is primarily understood in terms of the way that thought “flies” from 
intense suffering “as promptly and irresistibly as an animal flies from death”.
1
 Compassion is 
conceived by Weil as being at the centre of all authentic spirituality, and as a kind of litmus test 
for truthful engagement with the world (and with God). Compassion relies upon the giving of 
attention, and to give one’s attention to one who suffers means to resist a powerful urge which is 
felt at physical, emotional, cognitive and spiritual levels. Attention, in turn, is considered most 
often as a kind of openness, or receptivity; a willingness to encounter—or even be penetrated 
by—what is given in the real.
2
 Weil suggests in a number of places that the power to attend is 
right at the centre of personal identity, and supplies the only real possibility of acting upon one’s 
character (a suggestion that Iris Murdoch developed in Sovereignty of Good).
3
 Finally, these two 
aspects of Weil’s thought are closely aligned with a third; her pervasive suspicion of 
“consolation”. On the whole, consolation is aligned with the “imagination” that insulates and 
removes one from reality.
4
 One can console oneself when suffering with thoughts about the 
future,
5
 or with attempts to explain one’s suffering as a part of some larger, coherent whole or as 
a necessary means to some desirable end.
6
 Equally, one can cushion oneself from any real 
encounter with the suffering of others with similarly evasive movements of thought: one begins 
to see the suffering other as representative of a class of people defined by such suffering; 
thereafter, their situation no longer seems surprising.
7
  
I take Weil’s understanding of the matters briefly summarised above to be profound and 
phenomenologically convincing in any number of ways. Nevertheless, my aim in this chapter is 
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to raise some questions about this picture. Put simply, my argument is as follows: even though 
Weil is deeply sensitive to the ways that the capacity for attention determines one’s way of 
relating to others, on the whole she conceives of attention as a private operation of the individual 
“soul”. However, there are good reasons to think that in many cases, attention is something 
shared, even to the point where one might wish to talk about a “joint subject” of attention.
8
 I 
hope to show that examination of the way that attention is shared in compassion helps to bring to 
light ways in which such attention might be “creative”, to use a term that Weil herself uses on 
one occasion. Following from this, I hope to show that this shared dimension of attention may 
change how we conceive of the relationship between compassion and “consolation”.  
It is very apparent that this will discussion will not be able to address everything that 
would be necessary in order to fully bring the idea of joint attention to bear upon Weil’s 
philosophy. There will remain some important questions to answer concerning how well the 
ideas below might integrate into Weil’s religious metaphysics, especially concerning her 
underlying conception of the human person, and of the ultimate significance of human relations. 
Nevertheless, the picture that I have tried to sketch offers, I believe, a small but significant 
complication of Weil’s account of attention, and a useful starting point for further exploration. 
 
 
Attention and the Difficulty of Compassion 
Weil’s account of the nature of attention, its encounter with suffering, and its role in moral and 
spiritual life is one of the most thoroughly explored and commonly employed themes of her 
work, so I will try to give a fairly concise description of it here.
9
  
Weil believed that compassion is difficult because it involves recognition of a basic truth 
about reality as a whole, and therefore of our own existential condition. So, although we 
encounter individual instances of suffering at particular moments, our capacity to respond with 
compassionate attention in these moments depends upon a willingness to accept a more universal 
truth about the human condition which is manifest in individual cases. Weil describes this truth 
in a number of different ways: that all those features that we most essentially identify as 
ourselves are subject to the mechanical workings of “necessity”;
10
 that there is no final good to 
be found “here below”;
11
 or, as in her essay on the Iliad, the exposure of all that is most precious 
to blind force.
12
 In each case, the point is the same: thought flies from affliction because it 
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presents us with that which we cannot, or will not, accept.
13
 In “Human Personality” this is 
memorably expressed in terms of the knowledge that I could lose, in a moment, everything that I 
consider essential to my sense of self:  
Human thought is unable to acknowledge the reality of affliction. To acknowledge the 
reality of affliction means saying to oneself: ‘I may lose at any moment, through the play 
of circumstances over which I have no control, anything whatsoever that I possess, 
including those things which are so intimately mine that I consider them as being myself. 
There is nothing that I might not lose. It could happen at any moment that what I am might 




And so for Weil, the resistance we may feel to giving attention to those whose suffering we 
encounter is evidence not so much of a lack of moral vigour or sensitivity (i.e. it is not primarily 
a failing of will, or of sensibility), but rather of a deep-seated fear and unwillingness to encounter 
the real.
15
 We walk past the afflicted because of the truth that they contain in their person. But if 
we can consent to pay attention to the afflicted, it means that we love reality because it is real, 
not because it is hospitable to our desires. Attention draws us out of the sphere of imagination in 
which we are, on the whole, immersed, and puts us into redemptive contact with reality.
16
  
We can note two ways in which to understand the value of compassion, and the attention 
it is made of, on Weil’s account. Firstly, attention is that which is most essential on the path 
towards moral regeneration and spiritual liberation. Her understanding of what attention is, how 
it is cultivated and why it is valuable has to be understood in relation to some of the more 
obscure and speculative aspects of her thought: the idea of “decreation”, and the various 
speculative metaphysical structures that go along with it. However, for the purposes of this 
discussion it is the other side of the coin which is of greater interest: attention is also that which 
is called for, that which answers most deeply to the “cry” of suffering. The notebooks and essays 
are full of reflections on the first aspect: the way that attention is linked to a redemptive 
encounter with the real; the relationship between compassion and this kind of unflinching 
acceptance and affirmation. But, it seems to me, there is rather less reflection on the second 
point; this, in turn is perhaps because in the notebooks Weil seems far more concerned to give an 
account of the conditions of the possibility of giving attention than she is to give an account of 
what it is like to receive compassion. In order to explore what Weil might have to say about this 
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latter point, I will give a close reading of a few short passages from the essays contained in 
Waiting on God, which, I believe, can be seen as opening onto an important question about her 
understanding of attention. 
 
Suffering as Question 
At the end of the oft-quoted “Reflections on the Right use of School Studies”, Weil makes what 
initially seems to be the same point in two slightly different ways. After noting that the love of 
God and the love of neighbour both have attention for their substance, she writes: 
Those who are unhappy have no need for anything in this world but people capable of 
giving them their attention. The capacity to give one’s attention is a very rare and difficult 
thing; it is almost a miracle; it is a miracle. Nearly all those who think they have this 
capacity do not possess it. Warmth of heart, impulsiveness and pity are not enough.
17
 
Weil is perfectly aware that those who are “unhappy” may in fact need quite a number of things 
in addition to attention, but her point is that we must first of all become attentive in order to 
respond adequately to the needs of others (as she makes clear in “Forms of the Implicit Love 
God” and “The Love of God and Affliction”). Weil then seems to continue in the same vein 
when she continues: 
In the first legend of the Grail, it is said that the Grail (the miraculous stone vessel which 
satisfies all hunger by virtue of the consecrated host) belongs to the first comer who asks 
the guardian of the vessel, a king three-quarters paralysed by the most painful wound: 
‘What are you going through?’ 




However, in fact, Weil has introduced an important distinction without noting, or perhaps being 
aware of it, in terms of the object of attention. In the first case, we have the idea that “the 
unhappy” themselves need to be the object of another’s attention: the compassionate direct their 
attention to those who suffer. Weil goes on to describe this attention in terms of an emptying: I 
empty the “contents” of my soul in order to receive into myself the other being.
19
 But in the 
second articulation, the attention that is required takes the form of a question that asks the 
sufferer about their suffering. Presumably, then, the eventual object of attention would be the 
answer that the sufferer gives to the question “what are you going through?” This would suggest 
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that receiving compassion is an experience of being heard, and if we interpret the second 
formulation as specifying more precisely what it means to “receive” into myself “the other 
being”, then we would have something like the following: in order to be compassionate, I must 
be receptive to the way in which the other is concerned with their suffering; with what they feel 
themselves to be “going through,” and how.  
The idea that the deepest suffering is found in the form of a question is central to Weil; 
there are similar references throughout the notebooks, and she returns to a similar theme in her 
essay “Human Personality.” Here she discusses the difference between the conceptions of rights 
and justice: whereas the notion of rights concerns distribution, and arises in response to the 
question “why has somebody else got more than I have?”, justice concerns the prevention of 
harm, which has been done whenever the question “why am I being hurt?” arises involuntarily as 
a “surprised cry” within the person.
20
 In both essays, then, we have the sense that compassion 
concerns questions, whether it is asking the redemptive question “what are you going through?” 
or listening compassionately to the question “why is this happening to me?”.  
If we try to combine the phenomenology of these two questions, there is no way that we 
can think of the attentive experience straightforwardly in terms of an attentive subject and the 
intended/attended object. Firstly, it would seem as though Weil conceives of the power of the 
question “what are you going through?” not in terms of the opportunity for the sufferer to give a 
clear answer, precisely because as she understands it the experience that the question asks about 
can only be expressed as a question: the surprised cry “why is this happening to me?”. And so 
presumably if the question “what are you going through?” is a manifestation of love of 
neighbour it must be because it is a request to be invited into the other’s contemplation of that 
which they think on—the question they ask—so as to join them in it. Secondly, the question 
“why am I being hurt?” is not directed from the sufferer to their comforter. For Weil, this kind of 
question is ultimately directed in confusion at God, or the universe (which for Weil amounts to 
the same thing). It is a question ultimately directed to whatever it is that permits or makes 
possible such suffering.
21
 So again, if I ask “what are you going through?”, then I must learn to 
pay attention not just to the other, but to that which the question “why am I being hurt?” directs 
me; I must learn to pay attention with the questioning other.  
This may seem like a rather fine distinction, but as I hope to show, I think it exposes 
something important about the question of what it is like to receive compassion, and the nature 
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of attention. This point can be developed through consideration of the figure of Job. In Job’s 
case, there is his suffering, then his contemplation of that which causes him to suffer, and then 
there is further suffering that arises from this contemplation. He does not just suffer; he thinks on 
his suffering—he is unable not to think on his suffering. But, crucially, Job does not just think, 
obsessively, on his suffering; he thinks on his suffering alone. Even though his companions are 
able to pay attention to his situation, and to his distress, they are increasingly unable to attend to 
it in the way in which he attends to it; it cannot appear, to them, as it appears to him. That is, his 
companions are unable, or unwilling, to think on his suffering as morally perplexing, as a 
challenge to the goodness of God, as an outrage, and so on. And so, finally, he does not just think 
of his suffering alone; he thinks of his suffering alone in the presence of others. If there is a 
failure of compassion here, it is related to the failure to contemplate the suffering of another as 
and with; to contemplate it in its manner of appearing to them, with them.  So it is not so much 
that something is not given, but more that something doesn’t happen.  
All this is suggested, rather than clearly affirmed, by the passages from Weil’s essays that I 
have quoted above, but in some respects the picture that I have briefly sketched above is slightly 
different to the one that emerges as the “majority report” in Weil’s work. Perhaps the best way to 
describe the kind of thing that Weil is trying to describe when she uses the term “attention” is in 
terms of a “posture”.
22
 Her main efforts are spent in trying to describe the way in which this 
posture involves a self-displacement or renunciation, a loving patience, and a willing and 
receptive openness. It is passive in that it involves “waiting” for that to which it attends to 
disclose itself, but equally active: firstly, in the sense that this openness must be deliberately 
maintained; secondly in that it is always mingled with love. It “turns” toward the object of 
attention, but it does not move towards it; it “desires without approaching”.
23
 And for Weil, the 
faculty of attention is both the true location of personal agency, and an entirely solitary practice. 
After noting that the highest achievements in art or in science have a certain “impersonal” 
quality, she writes: 
Impersonality is only reached by the practice of a form of attention which is rare in itself 
and impossible except in solitude; and not only a physical but mental solitude. This is 
never achieved by man who thinks of himself as a member of a collectivity, as part of 
something that says ‘We’. 
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Men as parts of a collectivity are debarred from even the lower forms of the impersonal. A 
group of human beings cannot even add two and two.
24
 
One cultivates attention only by withdrawal from the socially constructed readings of the world 
that feed upon and further nourish imaginary desires. Equally, the part of the person that 
generates the “surprised cry” of injustice is the impersonal; the aspiration for the good, which 
exists in all people.
25
 When, in the Marseilles notebooks, Weil comments that justice simply 
means recognising that the other exists, and that this recognition involves a stripping away of 
oneself, so as to conceive of oneself “as oneself and another” she seems to mean precisely this: 
that one recognises that there is simply one good, which is the same in all people – and this good 
is the desire for good.
26
 Attention at its deepest level—and as a result, the experience of 
compassion—really does correspond with impersonality, and does not seem to cohere with the 
idea of unrepeatably specific interpersonal encounters. In the discussion that follows, I aim to 
show that Weil may have overlooked the way in which attention might, in some cases, be an 




In his book The Ethical Demand, Knud Ejler Løgstrup articulates a vision of ethical 
responsibility for the other based on a phenomenology of the way in which “our lives are in each 
other’s hands.” In reflecting upon the meaning of Jesus’ teaching about love of neighbour, 
Løgstrup writes: 
If my relation to the other person is the place where my relation to God is determined, then 
it must at the same time be the place where that person’s existence is so totally at stake that 
to fail him is to fail him irreparably. [. . .] If human beings were so independent of one 
another that the words and deeds of one were only a dispensable luxury in the life of 
another and my failure in relation to the life of the neighbour could easily be made up later, 
then God’s relation to me would not be as intimately tied up with my relation to the 
neighbour as the proclamation of Jesus declares it to be.
27
 
Løgstrup’s attempt to render this into “strictly human terms” consists in showing, in a variety of 
senses, the way in which a “silent” demand emerges from the fact of our constitutive inter-
dependence. It is because that which is of “decisive importance” in the other’s life will—to some 
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degree, in some way—be determined by their relation to me that I must use insight, imagination 
and understanding to judge how to best to serve their interests. What is particularly salient for the 
purposes of this discussion is the way in which Løgstrup emphasises the way that we shape each 
other’s world not just through conscious action, but through attitude. For example, he writes:  
By our very attitude to one another we help to shape one another’s world. By our attitude 
to the other person we help to determine the scope and hue of his or her world; we make it 
large or small, bright or drab, rich or dull, threatening or secure. We help to shape his or 
her world not by theories and views but by our very attitude toward him or her. Herein lies 
the unarticulated and one might say anonymous demand that we take care of the life which 
trust has placed in our hands.
28
 
So for Løgstrup, responsibility emerges from the existential porousness that characterises human 
life: before and beyond any conscious attempts, we shape each other’s worlds; we shape each 
other’s worlds even by our own way of thinking about the world. In what follows I want to 
explore how the notion of “joint attention” might help to shed some light on one aspect of this 
interdependence; the way in which our own capacity for attention always has something to do 
with others.   
The term ‘joint attention’ refers to the incredibly sophisticated yet mundane capacity, 
developed from around 9-12 months onwards in most humans, to be aware of another’s 
awareness of the object of one’s own awareness.
29
 Infant pointing is now understood by many 
developmental psychologists to be an attempt to initiate periods of joint attention with an adult: 
not just to direct the adult’s attention to some object, but to have their own interest in an object 
pointed at recognised and shared. Much of this research has been linked with an increased 
understanding of autism, and autism is now considered by some to be closely related to 
difficulties in the development of the capacity to respond to and initiate bids for joint attention.
30
 
When it comes to a precise conceptual articulation of the “jointness” or “openness” in joint 
attention, there are considerable philosophical difficulties lurking, but I will risk using two 
summaries from the literature to introduce the concept. According to Naomi Elian, joint attention 
refers to the capacity to form triangles of attention: 
Each subject is aware, in some sense, of the object as an object that is present to both 
subjects. There is, in this respect, a “meeting of minds” between both subjects, such that 
the fact that both are attending to the same object is open or mutually manifest.
31
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As Elian points out, there is something “utterly simple and basic” about the transparency 
involved here, something that philosophical accounts of “common knowledge” that rely on an 
appeal to beliefs about what the other is aware of miss.
32
 In a similar way, John Campbell 
highlights the way that in episodes of joint attention the “jointness” is not something added on, 
but is integral to the experience as such: 
Just as the object you see can be a constituent of your experience, so too it can be a 
constituent of your experience that the other person is, with you, jointly attending to the 
object. [. . .] when there is another person with whom you are jointly attending to the thing, 
the existence of that other person enters into the individuation of your experience. The 
other person is there, as co-attender, in the periphery of your experience.
33
 
Whilst the formulation “joint attention” has emerged from very recent research in specific 
disciplinary contexts, it seems to be a notion that most people would intuitively recognise as a 
part of their daily interactions with others, and is not necessarily restricted to shared attention to 
immediate objects of sensory perception. For example: two parents watching their child’s first 
steps together might each experience the other’s excitement in such a way that this shapes their 
own experience;
34
 two strangers might subtly acknowledge each other’s presence in a public 
place;
35
 one might feel irritation when a friend keeps checking their phone whilst one is speaking 
to them, as one feels one’s own attention drawn, with theirs, towards the phone, and so on. All of 
these may testify to the way that joint attention is basic to our social lives. However difficult it 
may be to articulate philosophically the “openness” that characterises joint attention, it appears to 
be a basic constituent of many of the most important social experiences.  
For the purposes of this discussion, the most important aspect is the way in which joint 
attention involves shared orientation to the object of attention. Drawing on research on infant 
pointing, Malinda Carpenter and Kristin Liebal emphasise the way in which infant pointing 
seems to be a bid to direct attention to an object and to share interest in that object.
36
 To fully 
attend with the infant is only possible if the adult is willing to demonstrate not just that they, too, 
can see whatever it is, but that they, too can share an interest—fascination, surprise, etc.—in it. It 
is this aspect of joint attention that I want to focus on here, and a couple of brief examples will, 
hopefully draw out more clearly the point here.  
Suppose I am in a jazz bar listening intently to a trumpet solo with my brother, a keen 
jazz musician. During the solo, as a result of incomprehensible intuitive improvisational 
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dynamics, the drummer, pianist and trumpeter join in one particularly memorable moment of 
spontaneity. I turn to look at my brother, who sensing me looking at him, turns to me, grins, 
raises his eyebrows and nods. We both turn back to the stage again, clapping. In this case, I am 
tempted to say that the sense of sharing attention conditions my experience of the memorable 
moment in the first place: would I have noticed that moment had I been with someone else, or 
alone? It is, in part, my brother’s love of jazz, and my awareness of his expertise that heightens 
my awareness in the first place. But suppose that, when I turn to my brother to see his reaction, 
he is idly stirring his drink, staring at the table, and does not catch my eye, then although we may 
be both hearing the same music at the same time, we are not jointly attending to it, and I would 
not feel like I had shared the experience. Similarly, if, at some kind serious formal occasion—
let’s say a funeral—the speaker says something unintentionally hilarious, I may briefly catch a 
particular friend’s eye, and recognise immediately that they share the joke by observing almost 
imperceptible facial changes. I might well then spend the rest of the occasion avoiding their 
gaze, because somehow the humour of the comment is amplified when we consider it together; 
indeed, if this particular friend wasn’t present, perhaps there would be no danger at all of 
potentially disruptive laughter. The key thing in both examples is not just the shared experience 
of an event, but the shared attitude towards it, the awareness of sharing an attitude towards it, and 
the way that acknowledgement of this sharing seems to amplify the sharedness  - to make it more 
“open”, and to add a texture that would be otherwise lacking. 
 
Joint Attention and Compassion 
The intuition that drives this paper is that very often when I experience compassion from another 
it is in the form of shared, or joint, attention. Since very often one suffers through the thought of 
that which oppresses, it seems to be true that if there is to be any “suffering-with”, then it must 
involve a shared awareness of that which oppresses. The easiest way to show how I think this 
might be the case is through a series of relatively mundane examples, which are a fictional 
composite of a number of real episodes. 
 Suppose I am unemployed and have, after a long series of unsuccessful attempts, failed 
once again to get an interview for a job. The job in question had seemed like a perfect fit for me; 
not only did it involve working for an organisation whose work I value, it required skills that I 
believe I possess, and would have utilised experience I know I have. It was also fairly well-paid, 
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which would have helped considerably with on-going money problems I have been having, and 
near to my home, which would make family life easier. I did the best job of the application form 
I know how to. I know that jobs like this come around once every few years, and that I am very, 
very unlikely to have another chance to apply for a similar position in the near future.  Not long 
after I find out that I have not been invited to interview, a close friend calls round and asks me 
how I am. I explain what has happened. My friend looks at me, and expresses something to the 
effect that he is really sorry, ‘that must be so frustrating’, etc. My friend, as it happens, has a job 
that he enjoys, in a similar line of work. I talk at some length at how good this job would have 
been, how I can’t understand how I could not have been given an interview, and how rare these 
jobs are, and finish by saying something like ‘that was my one chance’. My friend pauses, and 
then says “well, you never know what’s round the corner.” As I hear these words, I feel a jolt of 
something that is very difficult to put into words, a kind of internal flinching. I reply with 
something non-committal, like “yeah, I suppose.” The conversation is slightly awkward from 
then on, and I do my best to change the topic.  
What happens in this instance? Perhaps it is something like this: the problem is not that 
my friend has not paid attention to me, or to my situation; the problem is that I do not feel as 
though they have been with me in attending to the situation. That is, I feel that we have both been 
considering the same set of facts, the same circumstances, but not in the same way; we have not 
been together in our consideration of the facts of the matter. There could be many explanations, 
in turn, for this failure: perhaps my friend is unwilling to accept just how unfair life can be, and 
how her own very-fortunate job situation is just the luck of the draw, rather than the result of any 
cosmic hand of justice, or the natural fruit of her own abilities; perhaps my friend simply does 
not quite see how frustrating my situation is, through lack of similar experience of her own. 
Perhaps, on the contrary it is because I am exaggerating the futility of my situation as a result of 
self-pity, and my friend is not willing to be complicit in this; perhaps my reactions to her 
attempted consolation are tinged with envy. Either way, the point is that what is missing is the 
sense of someone paying attention not just to me, but to the situation to which I am attending, in 
the way that I am attending to it. But it is the way in which I think about the situation which 
oppresses me, not simply the fact of not having a job.  
Let us change the scenario slightly. This time, after two weeks of not hearing anything 
about the job in question, I phone the organisation to ask if invites to interview have been sent 
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out, and am subsequently told that my application was not received, due to an error in their 
computer system. The error was only discovered after the interviews had taken place, when they 
suddenly received a batch of old emails, including several applications. They are very sorry, but 
there is nothing they can do about this. Later that day, a close friend asks me about the job. I 
explain, briefly and angrily what has happened. I hear concern her their voice, and see in her face 
that the senselessness of the situation is dawning on them. But I dismiss the conversation, with 
some kind of comment that conveys bitter light-heartedness. I then change the subject very 
quickly. I am still unsettled when my friend leaves, and feel like the encounter has tired me out a 
little. Here it would seem that I refuse the opportunity to allow another to contemplate a situation 
with me, and to share my frustration. Why is this? Perhaps it is that I do not trust this person 
enough to allow them this intimacy, but perhaps it is also because I do not wish to contemplate it 
myself. To see the stupidity of the situation in the face of another person would be an invitation 
to face it myself, and I am unwilling to do this. It is as though my friend’s frustration at the 
mistake, and their concern for me would make it more real. 
Finally, let us say that the friend works part-time in a job which is tolerable, but not ideal, 
and has two children, the youngest of which has recently been diagnosed with a cancerous 
tumour on her leg at the age of three, and has been undergoing chemotherapy. I bump into my 
friend whilst walking in the park: I am there to try to lift my depressed mood; she is out with her 
youngest child. She asks how I am, and I briefly explain, looking down and largely avoiding her 
gaze. When I finish, my friend grimaces slightly, nods, and says “that’s rough”. She does not 
have to make it clear to me that she sees how frustrating the situation is (I do not reflect on this at 
the time, but for some reason, I sense that intuitively). After replying with a brief agreement, I 
look over at her three year-old daughter, who is engrossed by a nearby tree stump, which she is, 
with some effort, climbing on and then jumping off. We are silent for a short while, then I say: 
“she’s pretty great, isn’t she?” My friend smiles. We watch silently for a short while. Then my 
friend looks back at me, and says “you’ll be ok, you know.” I nod, and reply: “I know. Thanks.” 
There is another pause, filled with the sound of my friend’s daughter talking to herself, and then 
we leave each other. I go home feeling lighter and calmer, although still frustrated. 
If this final example can be taken as a case of shared attention in the form of compassion, 
then it is not straightforwardly something that I receive from her, even though she is certainly 
both generous and attentive; it seems, rather, to be something that arises between us. The 
Dr Stuart Jesson, York St John University 
 
conditions of this arising depend to a large degree on my instinctive assessment of my friend’s 
character, her attitude towards her own problems, as well as to me. I sense intuitively that my 
friend has the capacity, or preparedness, to contemplate the difficulty of my situation with me; 
this means she does not have to make any effort to make this clear, or draw any attention to her 
own empathy. She does not, then, ask me to attend to or notice her own kindness.  Strangely, 
however, the simple fact that I sense that someone else has attended to the problem that I am 
concerned with, in the way that I am concerned with it, alters the significance that the situation 
has for me. Why is this? The situation remains the same, and for the sake of argument, let us say 
that my pessimistic assessment of the situation is pretty accurate. But my way of attending to the 
situation has been changed, somehow. I am no more optimistic than I was, and my pessimism 
has not been reduced, but it is as though it now occupies less space in my psyche. There is 
something paradoxical here, I think: my friend’s attention to and with me changes my experience 
only because she does not try to change it, but enters into it as it is; the willingness to accept my 
reaction to the situation as it is means that I no longer react to it in the same way. She does not 
force her hope on to me as a consolation that should drive away my initial reaction, but because 
we are attending jointly (to my troubles, to her daughter), her own hope, in the face of her own 
fears—which are deeper, and more serious—affects me, and it bleeds into my own. Of course, in 
this scenario part of the reason for this is that we also share attention in another way: to her 
daughter, her daughter’s contentment in the middle of difficulty, her simplicity (in fact, we 
attend together to the way that her daughter is, in turn, happily and effortlessly engrossed by the 
world outside her).  In sharing my friend’s love, enjoyment and deep concern for her daughter, I 
am somehow enabled to react differently to my own circumstances.  
It is important to point out a danger here. Many of Weil’s comments about the nature of 
compassion are written in relation to extreme suffering; to “affliction”. She leaves hints in the 
notebooks about how she conceived of the relationship between the “supernatural compassion” 
that responds to affliction and the “natural pity” with which people quite ordinarily respond to 
more mundane suffering, but these are not developed enough to draw firm conclusions from.
37
 
The examples above concern relatively trivial difficulty, and are as far as they could be from the 
extreme degradation that Weil tried to grapple with. It might be argued, then, that what I have to 
say here simply has no bearing on Weil’s understanding of compassion, and as she affirms a 
qualitative difference between “suffering” and “affliction”, one would expect a clear difference 
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in the kind of attention at work in compassionate responses to each. However, Weil is very clear 
that there is a single disposition to, or faculty of, attention; whether it orients us toward beauty, 
truth, solutions to practical problems and the needs of others, it is the same basic “posture”. This 
precisely why, as she famously writes, every school exercise, when undertaken with the right 
quality of attention, is “like a sacrament”: attention to a simple geometry problem can help to 
cultivate the kind of attention that will one day be turned to the bleeding body at the side of the 
road.  Even if the break between suffering and affliction is thought to be consistently maintained 
in her work (and there are good reasons to think that this is not the case),
38
 wherever attention 
operates, it will have the same quality of suspended, patient openness, and will ultimately rely on 
the same kind of renunciation. Similarly, although there is a certain point beyond which suffering 
begins to destroy the personality, and so becomes almost impossibly difficult to dwell upon, 
Weil very clearly thought that the human resistance to such attention was all of a piece; it is 
resistance to “the knowledge that kills”.
39
 So if the episodes above do give rise to any insights 
about the nature of attention in these relatively mundane situations, then there are good Weilian 
reasons to think that we might be able to at least try to apply them elsewhere.  
 
Consolation and Creative Attention 
As I have already attempted to show, there is an aspect of attentive compassion which appears to 
be only faintly visible in Weil’s account, namely, the “attending-with” outlined above. It should 
also be clear from the third episode above that I am trying to suggest that the experience of such 
shared attention may be deeply consoling in some way. And so there is a further point to be 
made here, which has a bearing on the way that Weil discusses “consolation”. As already 
indicated, Weil’s understanding of the great difficulty of attention, and of the pervasive hold of 
“imagination” is organically related to her frequent expressions of suspicion towards consolation 
in various forms (“consolations are manufactured by the imagination”).
40
 On the whole, 
“consolation” is the term that Weil gives to the products of the compensatory operation of the 
imagination, which always searches for balance (“the search for balance is bad because 
imaginary”).
41
 And the cultivation of attention goes hand in hand with the refusal to entertain 
such consolation: 
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“We should set aside the beliefs which fill up voids, soften bitternesses. The belief in 
immortality. The belief in the usefulness of sins: ‘etiam peccata’. [What is useful is that 
they should be made manifest.] The belief in the providential ordering of events. 
(In short, the ‘consolations’ which are often sought in religion).” 
It seems fairly clear that at this point, and in similar passages, Weil has in mind here primarily 
the solitary realm (the self-absorbed day-dream; the desperate scramble for a reassuring thought) 
or, less often the “collective” realm (the illusions that are produced through agreement, the 
superstitious repetition of religious dogmas). Consolations are those thoughts that are produced 
by the refusal of imbalance, or “void”, and so by their very nature distance us from reality. But 
what of the consoling word that the compassionate person may want to offer? Does compassion 
not aim at consolation, and if not, what is its end? 
In another well-known passage from “Forms of the Implicit Love of God”, Weil describes 
the moment of compassionate attention by calling to mind the image of the beaten man by the 
side of the road, from the parable of the Good Samaritan: 
Those who pass by this thing scarcely notice it, and a few minutes afterwards do not even 
know that they saw it.  Only one stops and turns his attention towards it.  The actions that 
follow are just the automatic effect of this moment of attention.  The attention is creative.  
But at the moment when it is engaged it is renunciation.  This is true, at least, if it is pure. 
The man accepts being diminished by concentrating on an expenditure of energy, which 
will not extend his own power but will only give existence to a being other than himself, 
who will exist independently of him.’
42
 
As already noted, the idea that real attention involves renunciation is one of the most striking 
themes in Weil’s work. Similarly, the idea that attention determines action is also found 
throughout, in discussions of creativity as well as human interactions. In one place, for example 
Weil notes that “a poem is beautiful to the precise degree in which the attention, whilst it was 
being composed, has been turned toward the inexpressible.”
43
 However, the idea that attention 
itself is creative is not so familiar, and those who have read more of Weil’s work may feel that 
this represents a slight, but significant change in her understanding of attention – if not in content 
then certainly in emphasis.
44
  
On the whole, the impression is that attention waits, turns, desires, opens; but without 
changing anything except the one who attends. It is active insofar as it involves a kind of 
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consent, but to consent to pay attention is consent to encounter reality as it is, to allow oneself to 
be “penetrated” by things as they are in themselves, as she puts it in her essay on school 
studies.
45
 However, in this passage Weil continues: “[c]reative attention means really giving our 
attention to what does not exist.  Humanity does not exist in the anonymous flesh lying by the 
road-side.”
46
 So in the moment that Weil is describing here, it is as though the attention that 
compassion consists in somehow precedes its own object, and—perhaps as a result of this—it 
gives something. Weil’s account of how and why this attention can only be “creative” draws 
quite unsystematically upon a number of different ideas and images, and the train of thought is 
not perfectly clear. One theme that runs through the discussion is essentially an interpretation of 
the parable of the sheep and the goats, which aims to show how love of neighbour is one of the 
ways in which God is “really though secretly present”.
 47
 There is not space here to give a full 
account of this train of thought, but what we can note is that as we have already seen, Weil very 
quickly abstracts from the reflections on texture of inter-personal encounter to a much more 
abstract level of discourse, so that the focus is no longer on what goes on between the two 
characters, but on what goes on within each of them, or—which is the same—between each of 
and God. 
 The other central theme in this section concerns justice, compassion and dignity. She 
begins by noting that all-too-often acts of generosity end up producing a “servile” gratitude in 
the recipient, and self-satisfaction or a sense of power in the benefactor.
48
 The true miracle of 
justice or love (the terms are intentionally conflated here) is that compassion becomes 
compatible with respect. As she later writes: “The supernatural virtue of justice consists of 
behaving exactly as though there were equality when one is the stronger in an unequal 
relationship.”
49
 This non-condescension opposes a powerful tendency; on the whole, people give 
to those in need as if they were buying an object, with the aim of either no longer being obliged 
to think of them, or (worse) for the pleasure of feeling the distance between them and oneself.
50
 
The notion of creativity enters the picture because of this non-condescension: “[h]e who treats as 
equals those who are far below him in strength really makes them a gift of the quality of human 
beings, of which fate had deprived them. As far as it is possible for a creature, he reproduces the 
original generosity of the Creator with regard to them.”
51
 For Weil, the creation action of God 
can only be understood as renunciation—“voluntary effacement”—because it involves a 
willingness not to command everywhere possible, and to accept diminution (because, for Weil, 
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“God and all his creatures are less than God alone”).
52
 The person whose attention rests willingly 
on the afflicted must accept and affirm a similar diminution, and one who has accepted such self-
denial has begun to be decreated, so as to allow God to love the world through her. Finally, then, 
Weil writes that the being who has been “reduced” by affliction receives a “soul borne of 
charity” as they receive the generous compassion of others: “to treat our neighbour who is in 
affliction with love is something like baptising him”.
53
 And her account of what this new birth 
consists in is developed along the same lines as her account of the decreation involved in 
compassion: the grateful recipient of compassion is enabled to love themselves in truth; they love 
themselves as a wretched finite being, totally exposed to necessity. The attention is “creative,” 
then, insofar as it allows the other to love themselves in truth, and to resist the impulse to despise 
the affliction to which they are subject, which is also their own inner possibility.   
So here again, Weil articulates the significance of this “supernatural gratitude” by 
immediately framing the capacity for such gratitude as in terms of an attitude towards reality as 
such: it means to consent to the reality which allows the suffering to which one is subject.
54
 And 
in doing so one affirms the whole of reality; it means that one judges the creation to be good.
55
 In 
other words, the account is given in terms of a relation between the individual sufferer and the 
world/God, not in terms of a relation between two individuals. For both the compassionate and 
the grateful, what is really of significance is the way in which such experiences depend upon and 
encourage an attitude towards God/reality, which is why she can write, in the New York 
notebook: “Praise to God and compassion for creatures. It is the same movement of the heart.”
56
 
Weil gives an extensive phenomenological account of the resistance to paying attention to 
suffering and the difficulty of compassion, of the spiritual trajectory necessary for such 
compassion, and sketches of the metaphysical structure which would accommodate these 
insights. But she does not seem to give a particularly textured account of what it is like to receive 
compassion, or of the relations involved in such an encounter. Andrea Hollingsworth’s more 
detailed discussion of the ideas briefly introduced above claims that Weil gives an account of the 
absent-presence of God in “relational spaces of shared suffering”.
57
 But we need to ask whether 
Weil’s account gives a rich enough account of the “sharedness” of these spaces. It is perhaps 
telling that in the key example (the parable of the Good Samaritan) the giving and the 
receiving—the attender and attendee—are very cleanly separated, because the suffering 
participant is unconscious. Job, on the contrary, will not stop speaking, which means that any 
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compassion he receives will be given by someone who has the—perhaps more subtle—capacity 
to enter into his questioning in the right way. If we are to give an account of what attentive 
compassion looks like in the latter case, we will, I believe, need one that includes the capacity to 
share, not just to give, attention. 
 
Conclusion 
Weil’s account of compassion has been developed in a particularly fruitful way by Raimond 
Gaita, and Gaita’s discussion will help to summarise what I believe is suggested, but ultimately 
not affirmed, in Weil’s writing on this subject, and how this may relate to the notion of a 
“creative attention”. Like Weil, Gaita is unsatisfied with any attempt to account for compassion 
simply in terms of an emotional addition to a prior cognitive recognition; instead the affective 
aspect of compassion must be considered as itself a form of recognition: “[i]t is an ethically 
necessitated responsiveness to the perception of what it meant for [someone] to suffer as they 
did.”
 58
 As part of his discussion, Gaita reflects on two episodes from his own life that have 
proved to be central to his own understanding of these matters, both of which concern attitudes 
towards, and treatment of, people suffering from serious mental health problems. The first 
centres on his encounter with a nun who, like Gaita, volunteered at a mental health institution in 
the 1960’s (originally recounted in his book A Common Humanity: Thinking about Love and 
Truth and Justice); the second concerns his father, who was friends with a man—Vacek—who 
was “visibly insane,” and who lived between two boulders near their house when Gaita was a 
boy (originally recounted in the autobiographical book Romulus, My Father). He writes: 
After I had written Romulus, My Father, a journalist asked me whether Vacek had seemed 
‘weird’ to me when I was a boy. Without hesitation I answered sincerely that he had not. 
Later, my answer puzzled me. Why had he not? Objectively, after all, he was very strange. 
The answer that came to me was that my father and Hora behaved towards Vacek without 
condescension. Had they condescended to him – had it shown in their tone of voice or 
demeanour, in their body language as we say – the cruel sensitivity children often possess 
would have made me conclude that Vacek was not entirely ‘one of us’. As it was, the 
contrary was true. That was not because I was particularly virtuous. It was because I saw 
Vacek in the light of my father’s and Hora’s behaviour towards him, which only later did I 
realize was something to wonder at.
59
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What we seem to have here is an example of how the sharing of attention might be creative: his 
father’s mode of responsiveness to Vacek is intuitively shared by Gaita, so that Gaita’s own 
attention was decisively oriented and shaped by his father’s.  
Similarly, we might then have an alternative way to construe the phrase “creative 
attention,” as well as a way to conceive of the relationship between compassion and consolation. 
Where it has not passed through any genuine attention to suffering, the consoling word or gesture 
may well be evasion, or wishful thinking; a dishonest and frightened optimism. But on the other 
hand, if there can be genuinely shared attention in the midst of suffering, then perhaps 
consolation may be found as a mysterious product of solidarity. Such consolation is not 
straightforwardly given, and if it is received, it is received somewhat mysteriously from a source 
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